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Jay E. Grenig is professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School, Milwaukee, WI;
(414) 288-5377.
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Statutes of limitations require those
claiming injuries redressable under
the law to file their claims within a
given period of time or lose the right
t' to redress. The obvious purpose of
!4 statutes of limitations is to prevent
stale claims and to prevent prejudice to defendants who, solely
through the passage of time, may
be unable to establish otherwise
valid defenses.
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incapacitated? In this
case, the Supreme Court
is asked to determine if a
taxpayer's mental
incompetence suspends
the running of the
statute of limitations for
filing a refund claim.
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What happens, however, when an
injured person is unable to assert
legal rights for reasons beyond his
or her control? Addressing that
possibility, the law has fashioned
the doctrine of equitable tolling
through which certain circumstances such as an individual's mental or physical incapacity or other
good reason may toll - that is, suspend - the running of a limitation
period. The doctrine focuses on the
personal inability of an injured individual to exercise the rights
involved, rather than on another's
conduct that allegedly prevented the
individual from exercising those
rights.
At issue in this case is whether the
doctrine of equitable tolling applies
to suspend the statutory period for
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For Whom Isthe Statute Tolled? May the
Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Be Applied to
Income Tax Refund Cases?

case
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What happens when a
taxpayer pays income
tax while mentally
incapacitated and the
time limit for filing a
refund claim also expires
while the taxpayer is

A

filing a claim for an income tax
refund. Without equitable tolling,
the applicable limitation period for
income-tax refund claims is three
years from the date the return was
filed or two years from the date
the tax was paid, whichever is
later. If no return was filed, the
limitation period is two years from
the date the tax was paid. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6511(a) (1994).

IsstE
Does the doctrine of equitable
tolling apply to claims for income
tax refunds?
FACTS
This case consolidates two cases
from the Ninth Circuit - Brockamp
v. United States, 67 F.3d 260
(9th Cir. 1995), and Scott v. United
States, 70 F.3d 120 (9th Cir. 1995)
(table disposition). In each case, a
taxpayer made income tax payments to the Internal Revenue
Service (the "IRS") while incapaci-
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tated, and the statute of limitations
for filing a refund claim expired
while the taxpayer was still
incapacitated.
In the Brockamp case, Marian
Brockamp is the administrator and
sole beneficiary of the estate of her
father, Stanley McGill. In 1984
Stanley McGill, who was 93 years
old at the time and manifesting
classic symptoms of senile dementia, mailed a check to the IRS for
$7,000 along with an application for
an automatic extension of time to
file his 1983 income tax return. No
return was ever filed. (According to
Marian Brockamp, her father routinely wrote checks for amounts far
in excess of the bill being paid. For
example, a bill for S100 was paid
with a check for S1,000.)
Stanley McGill died in 1988 at the
age of 98. During the administration
of his estate, Brockamp discovered
the $7,000 payment and requested
a refund. In a letter to the IRS, she
characterized her father as senile
and stated that he had mistakenly
sent the IRS a check for $7,000,
rather than $700. On March 27,
1991, Brockamp filed a tax return
for her father's 1983 tax liability.
The IRS assessed $427 in taxes for
that year but refused the refund
request on the ground that the
time period for filing a refund
claim had expired.
Two years later, Brockamp filed suit
against the United States in federal
district court seeking the return of
the money paid by her father. She
argued that the check was not subject to the time limitation of Section
6511(a) because it was a deposit,
not a tax payment. Brockamp also
argued that even if the $7,000 was a
tax payment, her refund claim on
behalf of her father's estate was not
barred because the limitation period
imposed by Section 6511(a) was

equitably tolled as a result of
McGill's mental incompetence.
The district court rejected both of
the arguments advanced by
Brockamp, concluding that the
$7,000 was a tax payment. The district court next ruled that the doctrine of equitable tolling never
applies to tax refund cases and,
therefore, that the refund claim was
barred by the statute of limitations.
859 F. Supp. 1283 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
Brockamp appealed to the Ninth
Circuit which reversed, ruling that
the doctrine of equitable tolling
applies in the context of an incometax refund claim. In particular, the
court noted that "it would be unconscionable to allow the government to
retain money that it concedes it was
not owed, and may have only
received due to a 93-year-old
man's senility." 67 F.3d at 263.
In the Scott case, Nicholas Scott's
father, acting under a power of attorney, made installment payments
totaling $30,096 to the IRS for
Scott's estimated income tax liability
for 1984. In 1989, Scott filed an
income tax return for the 1984 tax
year and also filed a refund claim for
the 1984 tax year. The IRS denied
the claim, asserting that the limitation period for claiming the refund
had expired. Scott then filed suit
against the United States in federal
district court seeking to recover an
overpayment of federal income taxes
for the 1984 tax year.
Scott contended that equitable
tolling principles prevented his
refund claim from being timebarred. According to Scott, from the
time his 1984 tax return was due to
the time he actually filed the return,
he suffered from severe alcoholism
which caused him to be mentally
incompetent and incapable of filing
a tax return.

The district court held that Scott's
alcoholism was sufficiently severe
to cause him to be mentally incompetent so that the statute of limitations for filing an income-tax
refund action was tolled. 847 F.
Supp. 1499 (D. Haw. 1993). In an
unpublished opinion, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit's holding that
the doctrine of equitable tolling
applies in the income tax context
is now before the Supreme Court
which granted the Government's
petition for a writ of certiorari.
116 S. Ct. 1875 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
The United States asserts that the
equitable tolling doctrine does not
apply to overcome the limitations
periods set forth in Section
6
511(a). In support of its position,
the Government places considerable reliance on the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v.
Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990) (suit
for refund that does not come
within the time limits of Section
6511 may not proceed),
7 ABA PREvIEw 228 (Feb. 16,
1990). According to the United
States, Congress did not intend the
detailed limitations provisions it
enacted to be disregarded on
equitable grounds.
The United States also argues that
tax refund statutes do more than
merely limit the time for commencing a lawsuit; they expressly
and unequivocally prohibit the
payment of claims that have not
been filed within the defined statutory periods. 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b).
In particular, the United States
points out that any refund made
after the applicable limitation period has expired is deemed erroneous and is void as a matter of
law. See 26 U.S.C. § 6514(a).

(Continued on Page 164)
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The Government goes on to
argue that Congress has enacted
substantive limits on refund
amounts, limits that are tied
directly to the limitations periods
set out in Section 6511(a).
Reference here is to Section
6511(b), 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b), which
limits the amount of any refund to
taxes actually paid within three
years of filing a tax return; if no
return was filed, the amount of any
refund is limited to taxes actually
paid within the two-year period
immediately preceding the filing
of a claim.
Asserting that Section 6511(b)
imposes substantive, rather than
procedural, limitations on tax
refunds, the United States contends
that the requirements of Section
6511(b) are not subject to modification under the doctrine of equitable
tolling. In other words, according to
the Government, even if the limitations periods established by Section
6511(a) were subject to equitable
tolling, the taxpayers in these two
cases still would get nothing
because neither taxpayer paid any
income taxes within either the twoyear or the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of their
respective refund claims. Brockamp
filed a return and a refund claim on
behalf of her deceased father in
1991, while no income taxes were
paid in the three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the
claim. Scott filed his claim for
refund in 1989, while no income
taxes were paid in the three-year
period immediately before the claim
was filed.
The taxpayers contend that the
legislative history of tax refund
litigation supports a conclusion
that Congress intended equitable
tolling to apply to refund suits.
They rely on Irwin v. Department
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of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89
(1990), 1 ABA PREVIEW5 (Sept. 28,
1990), a Supreme Court case decided shortly after the Dalm case on
which the United States relies. In
Irwin, the Court held that equitable
tolling should apply against the
United States as a defendant just as
it does against a private defendant.
(Irwin, however, was not a tax case,
as the Government repeatedly notes
in its argument in this case.)
According to the taxpayers, the
structure of Section 6511 is such
that, if the limitations periods in
Section 6511(a) are amenable to
tolling, the refund periods in
Section 6511(b) should be tolled for
the same length of time. Pointing
out that Section 6511(b) incorporates by reference the claim-filing
periods of Section 6511(a), the taxpayers assert that the refund periods of Section 6511(b) were not
intended to be absolute bars but
were intended to make the time
period for filing a refund claim coextensive with the period that the IRS
has to assess a tax against the taxpayer. In the event that the period
for filing a refund claim is tolled, the
taxpayers concede that the period
the IRS has for assessing additional
tax should be tolled for a commensurate period.
SIGNIFICANCE
It has been held that the equitable
tolling doctrine is read into every
federal statute of limitations, and
the decision to apply the doctrine
lies solely within the sound discretion of the court. Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
And as noted above, the Supreme
Court in Irwin held that "the same
rebuttable presumption of equitable
tolling applicable to suits against
private defendants should also apply
to suits against the United States."
498 U.S. at 95-96. Under Irwin, a

court assesses legislative intent to
determine if the statutory limitation
period at issue is subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling.
A year after Irwin, the Court
rejected equitable tolling for suits
under federal securities laws. Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis& Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), 7
ABA PREVIEW 238 (March 19, 1991).
It is important to note, however,
that securities-law statutes of limitations generally begin to run only
after discovery of a wrong, which, in
essence, is a species of equitable
tolling.
There is a split among the circuit
courts of appeals as to the application of the doctrine of equitable
tolling to tax refund actions. On the
one hand is the Ninth Circuit which
held in these two cases that the doctrine applies to income-tax refund
claims. On the other hand, the First,
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have
held that equitable tolling principles
do not apply. Oropallov. United
States, 994 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993);
Webb v. United States, 66 F.3d 691
(4th Cir. 1995); and Vintilla v.
United States, 931 F.2d 1444
(11th Cir. 1991).
In Webb, for example, the Fourth
Circuit determined that there is a
critical distinction between tax
refund suits and most other actions
against the United States. Pointing
to the Court's language in Irwin
regarding the application of equitable tolling against the Government
in the same way that it applies in
private suits, the Fourth Circuit
noted that tax suits cannot be
brought against private litigants, and
they are not even comparable to
such suits. Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit held that the presumption
announced in Irwin cannot apply to
suits for tax refunds.

Issue No. 2

A decision by the Supreme Court
that Section 6511(a) is subject to
the doctrine of equitable tolling
could affect a wide range of
timeliness provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code. Of course,
even if the doctrine of equitable
tolling applies to Section 6511(a), a
taxpayer still would need to prove
that his or her particular situation
satisfies the narrow grounds for
equitable tolling in order to proceed
to the merits of a claim.

ATTORNEYS OF THE
PARTIES
For the United States (Walter
Dellinger, Acting Solicitor General;
Department of Justice;
(202) 514-2217).
For Marian Brockamp,
Administrator of the Estate of
Stanley B. McGill, and Nicholas T.
Scott (Robert F. Klueger; Boldra &
Klueger; (818) 784-9601).

Where the taxpayer meets the
requirements for equitable tolling,
the statutory limitation period is
halted and any refund claim filed
within a reasonable period of time
would be timely under Section
6511(a) and timely under all other
statutory limitation periods that
incorporate Section 6511(a) by
reference. If a taxpayer is unable to
invoke the doctrine of equitable
tolling, he or she will be bound by
the statutory periods.
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